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PERMIT VIOLATION UNDER THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT 
Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, no one may place obstructions into the 
navigable waters of the United States without authorization from the Army 
Corps of Engineers 
United States v. San Juan Bay Marina 
239 F. 3d 400 
(Decided February 21, 2001) 
Defendant, the San Juan Bay Marina ("the Marina") has a number of 
commercial establishments located in piers in San Juan Harbor. The Marina leased 
the property from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Puerto Rico"). The Marina 
built new piers in the San Antonio Channel, part of the navigable waters of the United 
States, without obtaining the necessary permits from the Army Corps of Engineers 
("Anny Engineers''). 
In April 1992, the Marina applied to the Army Engineers for a permit to build 
an 80 by 40 foot platform adjacent to- and to become part of- the existing structure. 
The Anny Engineers issued a contingent permit for the construction, but it did not 
allow construction to start until the permit conditions were met. The Marina was 
required to obtain coastal zone certification or waiver from the Puerto Rico 
Environmental Quality Board. The Marina applied for the certification and/or waiver, 
but were denied by Puerto Rico. The defendant went ahead and built the platform 
anyway. 
In May 1992 the Marina had a permit that authorized reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of existing structures but it did not allow deviation from the original 
blueprints. However, the Marina had the pier reconstructed to twice its original size. 
In August 1993 the Marina applied for another permit to build onto the 
contingency authorized 80 by 40 foot platfom1 applied for in April 1992. The Army 
Engineers again issued a contingency permit requiring certification from the planning 
board. The planning board objected to the proposed project and the Army Engineers 
denied the permit. The defendants did not appeal this decision, but went ahead and 
constructed an additional structure of approximately 40 by 57 feet. Subsequently, on 
July 5, 1995, the Army Engineers issued a cease and desist order after inspecting the 
sight. Even after this order, the Marina built an additional structure, a "sushi bar" 
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without even a permit application having been filed. The Marina then built another 
pier without a permit measuring 300 by 5 feet. The Army Engineers amended its 
order in September 1995 to include these two later violations. 
In November 1995 the defendant filed for an-after-the-fact permit requesting 
approval for all the unauthorized structures. The Army Engineers denied this 
application and the United States brought suit under the Rivers and Harbors Act 
against the Marina to compel removal of the piers that had been erected without the 
requisite prior approval under the Act and sought an injunction against further 
construction. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary 
judgment to the United States and also ordered the injunction against further 
construction. Defendant appealed the grant of summary judgment arguing that the 
government of Puerto Rico was an indispensable party because it had a vested interest 
in the property and owned the premises. Defendant also argues that the Army 
Engineers should have approved the after-the-fact permit application because it was in 
the public interest that the structures be built, and that same public interest meant the 
plaintiff lacked standing to sue, and therefore the cease and desist order was not valid 
because it was not signed by the correct person. The Court of Appeals reviewed 
defendant's arguments de novo and found them to be frivolous and without merit 
thereby affirming the district courts decision. 
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, Section 403, has expressly stated for 
more than a century that no one may place obstructions into the navigable waters of 
the country without the authorization of the Army Engineers and that "the creation of 
any structure not affirmatively authorized by congress to the navigable capacity of 
any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build 
or commence the building of any wharf, pier. . .  except on plans recommended by the 
chief of engineers and authorized by the secretary of the army." The court found the 
record was clear that the defendant built structures without the necessary permits and 
therefore the grant for summary judgment was proper. 
The court disagreed with the argument that Puerto Rico was a necessary and 
indispensable party pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) and (b) and in the absence of such 
the action should be dismissed. The court found that the defendant admitted in its 
answer that the Marina is the "sole owner" of all the property in question, the lease 
made the lessee, i.e. the Marina, responsible for obtaining and complying with all 
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applicable state and federal permit. Moreover, the lease did not grant rights to build 
on submerged lands next to the leased piers and premises, and as such, Puerto Rico's  
reversionary interest is  in the improvements made on the leased property and the 
structures in question were made to submerged lands, and the order of the district 
court does not impair or impede Puerto Rico's ability to protect its interest in the 
property it does own, the original piers and structures. Finally, Puerto Rico is not a 
necessary party because the relief ordered by the district court is complete and 
concludes the controversy without harm to any legally cognizable interest Puerto Rico 
may have. Additionally, Puerto Rico never moved to intervene in the action perhaps 
because it did not deem its interests significantly threatened by the litigation, and the 
court was not going to second-guess this determination absent special circumstances. 
The court also rejected defendant's "public interest" argument holding that the 
proper avenue for such a challenge is an action for review of the denial of the permits 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 701. Because the 
defendant failed to bring such an action under the APA, they are foreclosed from 
collaterally attacking the denial of the permits in the present enforcement proceeding. 
The court further holds that under the APA the agency's judgment would be entitled 
to considerable deference and as such, the court will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency. 
The court found defendant's lack of standing argument incomprehensible as 
Congress expressly charged the Army Engineers with considering permit applications, 
and the United States clearly has standing under the statute to enforce cease and desist 
orders and to seek the removal of the structures built in violation of the law. 
Finally, defendant challenged Mr. Muniz, Chief of the Regulatory Field 
Office, signing of the cease and desist order. The court quickly dealt with this 
argument relying on 33 C.F.R. Section 325.8(b) wherein is supported the fact that the 
Army Corps District Engineer is authorized to delegate his authority and the permit 
may be signed for and on his behalf by whomever he designates. Therefore, Mr. 
Muniz signature was proper and valid. 
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Overall, the court found defendant' s  claims to be frivolous and unsupported by 
specifics. That coupled with the fact that defendant's willfully violated the Rivers and 
Harbors Act, resulted in the court awarding double costs against the defendants and to 
affirm the grant of summary judgment and order of enforcement to remove all 
referenced structures in all six claims. 
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